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The Blob 
Maurice Bloch 
The history of the social sciences and especially that of modern anthropology has been 
dominated by a recurrent controversy about what kind of phenomena people are.[1] On the 
one hand there are those who assume that human beings are a straightforward matter: 
they are beings driven by easily understood desires directed towards an empirically 
obvious world. The prototypical examples of such theoreticians are Adam Smith, Herbert 
Spencer, or more recently the proponents of rational choice theory.  The positions of 
these thinkers have been, again and again, criticised by those who have stressed that there 
can be no place in theory for actors who are simply imagined as “generic human beings” 
since people are always the specific product of their particular and unique location in the 
social, the historical and the cultural process. Among the writers who have made this kind 
of point are such as Emile Durkheim, Louis Dumont, and more recently Michel Foucault 
and the post-modernists. 
Anthropologists have tended to be on the side of the latter since they like to use their 
knowledge of exotic societies to argue that what the others see as “human nature” is 
merely the western person glorified. Such a point is justified, but the culturalists rarely go 
on to answer the very difficult questions which would follow from it. How far do they 
want their argument to go? Is there really nothing to be said about the species Homo 
Sapiens? 
The universalists criticise the culturalists by stressing the general aspects of such things 
as human cognitive development but then normally only pay lip service to the very 
difficult questions that cultural and historical variation pose for them. They are often 
joined, by implication at least, by cognitive scientists such as psychologists and analytic 
philosophers.  This is so sometimes because of an argued commitment to the universalist 
notion of a maximising individual, such as is the case for the proponents of the 
Machiavellian mind, but, more often, simply by default. 
The back and forth between these two ways of specifying human beings is in the end 
tiresome. The theoretical history of the social sciences has repeated itself far too often. 
We seem never to get anywhere since both sides seem to have good reasons for arguing 
that the other side is wrong without being able to incorporate the aspects of their 
opponents’ arguments which they usually also recognise, if only in passing, as valid. 
The reason for this continual repetition of old controversies is the ease with which both 
sides can criticise the unreality of their opponents’ understanding of people.  The 
culturalists point to the abstraction of disembodied a priori entities such as the rational 
actor of game theory, or the culture and history free creatures found in much of 
psychology. The universalists ridicule the equally bodiless and mindless creatures found 
in much of cultural anthropology where people are seen as nothing other than 
epiphenomena of specific cultures and localities. 
In this article I want to argue that the cause for the endless repetition of controversy, in 
the social sciences at least, comes from our failure to consider people as natural 
organisms rather than as the abstractions of unclear ontological status that characterise 
social science theory. If we focus on the evolved human animal – a very special being 
that is not, however, ontologically different from other living species – we can begin to 
understand the complex way in which we are created simultaneously by our biology, 
which includes our psychology, and by history and culture.  And we can do so without 
getting lost in the smoke of battle of the phantasy wars of social science theory. 
Furthermore, if we do this we can think together with the other cognitive sciences and 
explain to them in a more convincing way how much they need to seriously take into 
account the social and the cultural. 
*** 
My purpose in this article is to change the ground over which the old controversies have 
been fought to a manageable one where the different disciplines can meet to engage in a 
joint, yet difficult, enterprise. 
Here I concentrate on the topic over which the apparently irresoluble conflict between the 
universalists and the culturalists seems most intense.  The phenomenon I refer to is 
indicated by terms such as self, the I, agent, subject, person, individual, dividuals, 
identity, etc.  These terms all involve the attempt to describe what it is to be oneself or 
somebody else, in this or that place. (Indeed, we may already note here that the 
problematic distinction between self understanding and the representation of others is 
usually unexamined in most of the social science literature, by way of contrast with its 
treatment in cognitive science.) 
My lumping together of these different terms may well seem to be inappropriate, even 
sloppy, since many social science authors take great pain in distinguishing these words 
and in offering extremely precise definitions.  The problem, however, comes when we try 
to put together this massive literature – when, for example, we try to relate Geertz’s 
discussion of the Balinese “person” (1973), with Dumont’s “individual” (1983), Mauss’s 
“moi” (1938) and Rosaldo’s “self (1984).[2] When I try this I have to admit that I am 
completely lost and so you will have to excuse me if I refer to this entire indistinct 
galaxy, some part of which, or all of which, these terms appear to refer to, simply as the 
BLOB. This seems particularly justified since in spite of this multiplicity of would-be 
distinct labels much the same claims have been made, whatever word is used. 
When made by anthropologists, foremost among these claims is that the blob is 
fundamentally culturally and/or historically variable. This is what anthropologists mean 
when they say that there is no such thing as human nature, a proposition which poses the 
general epistemological problem of what then we are dealing with. Is the blob just an 
arbitrary category of culture, one that groups under various ethnocentric labels things that 
have nothing essentially to do with each other? If so, the blob, under whatever labels it 
masquerades, cannot be a suitable subject for theoretical study. 
This possibility, however, seems not to be taken very seriously by anthropologists in spite 
of their general predilection for radical cultural determinism.  When they actually get 
down to specifics we usually find much less ambitious propositions. It is not usually 
proposed that there are as many blobs as there are cultural variations but rather that there 
are two kinds of blobs in the world.  Sometimes this point is expressed generally as a 
contrast between the modern or western blob and the blob of the rest of mankind.  This is, 
for example, what Durkheim argued in The Division of Labour in Society with his 
distinction between organic and mechanical solidarity. 
Similarly Dumont (1983) stresses the same familiar dualist contrast of the individualism 
of the post reformation West with the holism of the hierarchical rest.  The same 
dichotomy is also found in the work of ethnographers or historians who, although they 
talk about particular places, argue that there, or then, the self, the person, the subject, or 
what have you, is different from what we, the modern west, have here and/or now.  Thus 
Wood (2008) argues that the very notion of self was absent in biblical times, Snell argues 
the same of the Iliad (1953), Marilyn Strathern argues that the New Guinea person is 
quite different to the Western one (1988), Kondo argues this for the Japanese self (1990), 
Marriott for India (1977), Geertz for Bali (1973), etc.  The west seems simply to be used 
as the contrast to the specific situations discussed, but, in fact, it turns out that these 
varied non-western non-modern places are very similar among themselves.  That is, they 
are places where interiority and individuality is devalued and where social relationships 
and group membership dominate.  More recently a further twist has been added with 
some writers arguing that in post-modernity we have now arrived at a post-blob, post-
modern, stage (Ewing 1990, Markus and Kitiyama 1991). This addition might be thought 
to lead to a tripartite division with pre blob, blob and post blob, but in fact the proposed 
pre-modern blob and the post-modern blob look singularly alike in that they are both non-
essentialist, distributed, contextual and divided.  Anthropological arguments about the 
blob can therefore be summarised as saying there is a great and absolute divide between 
the individualist west and the social relational rest. 
The basis for such repeated exhortation, that we should not assume, as the univeralists do, 
that what we know as the blob is applicable everywhere is real enough. It is a common 
experience of ethnographers who work in very different societies and cultural milieus, 
such as me to go no further, to be struck, and indeed even sometimes shocked, by how 
little value is given to individual motivations and how roles and group membership are 
the main, and often the only expressed, criteria of right conduct.  This is also reflected in 
certain non modern, non western legal codes such as those on which Mauss based himself 
in his discussion of the concept of the person, or in rituals, such as those discussed by 
Marilyn Strathern which she uses as the basis of her analysis of the Melanesian dividuals 
(Strathern 1988).  Such data does seem to produce a view of people as merely points in 
social systems while their internal states, their intentions, their absolute individuality and 
personal desires are irrelevant. This dichotomous contrast between the west and these 
“other” societies is often exaggerated (Béteille 1991, Lienhardt 1985, Parry 1989).  
However, there are very real and important differences between cultures which are worth 
discussing.  Thus, it is not my intention to minimise the significance of the cultural 
argued for in the works I have been implicitly or explicitly referring to, but instead to ask 
whether the facts that have been noted have the fundamental implications for the 
“construction” of the blob that so many social scientists give them. I shall argue that they 
do not but then, by integrating the work of anthropologists with that of cognitive 
scientists, I want to place the anthropological ideas within a model that is not 
antagonistic, but compatible, with what cognitive sciences can teach us. 
Two anthropological writers have already called into question the excesses of the 
relativist position in relation to the blob, especially when it goes under the name of “self”. 
Melford Spiro in a devastating critique of authors such as Marriott, Geertz and others 
demonstrates how the evidence used for such dramatic generalisations is selective 
(1993).  As an example, he notes that reference to the devaluation of the self in 
Therevada Buddhism is not, as has been suggested, evidence of the absence of the notion 
in a country such as Burma, but rather, of its presence.  In a somewhat similar vein 
Naomi Quinn (2006) criticizes recent post-modern writing in anthropology which 
suggests that the idea of the integrated self is outdated and/or wrong on the weak and 
trivial basis of the uncontroversial fact that people can hold contradictory ideas.  Her 
point is that explicit reflexive self representation cannot be equated with the blob as it is 
lived and, putting the words in her mouth that I will use below, that we must distinguish 
cognition and meta-representation, that is re-representations, in these cases public, about 
cognition (Sperber 2000).  (I am, however, much more hesitant than she is, given our 
present state of knowledge, in identifying various aspects of selfhood directly with 
different types of functional or anatomical areas of the brain.) 
Spiro and Quinn make two convincing and important criticisms of the work of 
anthropologists: firstly, they are right that anthropological writing about the blob is often 
spectacularly imprecise and, secondly, it is true that claims made in this area are 
commonly of very uncertain epistemological status. I also support explicitly Quinn’s 
implicit argument that the attempt at naturalising what is being talked about would help 
clear the fog (Quine 1969). 
The implication of the critiques by Spiro and Quinn is that anthropologists are wrong 
when they make the absolutist claim that the blob is simply a product of history and is 
totally culturally variable. Neither author, however, claims that culture and society do not 
have an influence, but the question how, and how far this is so, cannot be advanced until 
the epistemological status of what is claimed is clarified.  Thus, as both Spiro and Quinn 
recognise, it is not that anthropologists are talking about nothing in their discussions of 
self, person, agent, personality, identity, etc., but that what they are talking about, and 
how far they want to go, cannot be pinned down. 
As Spiro and Quinn have done a good job in criticising much of the previous 
anthropological writing on this topic, this clears the way for a more positive attempt at 
replacing the anthropology within the wider theory they implicitly call for. What follows 
is such an attempt. 
*** 
An obvious starting point is to distinguish levels in the phenomena to which the blob 
words seem to refer.  It is true that some anthropological writers do make a weak attempt 
at distinguishing levels but these are soon forgotten. Thus Mauss begins his essay on the 
self and/or the person in the following way: “I [shall not] speak to you of psychology… It 
is plain…that there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of 
his body, but also, at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical… My 
subject is entirely different…the notion that men in different ages have formed of  [the 
self]” (Mauss 1983: 3).  Yet the essay continues as a discussion of his “first subject”. 
Similarly, though the other way around, Antze and Lambek state in a book about culture 
and memory that autobiographical memory “and the “self” or “subject” mutually imply 
one another” (Antze and Lambek 1996: xxi). But we then find that they slide away from 
a discussion of the central issue by telling us that “our book is less about memory than 
about “memory”… That is to say it is about how the very idea of memory comes into 
play in society and culture…” (p.xv). These are presumably local ethno-psychological 
theories about whose value they do not commit themselves. Mauss says that he will not 
talk of psychology but does, while Antze and Lambek declare they will but don’t and 
instead talk of what I shall call below meta-representations. 
Distinguishing levels of the blob is very difficult but essential if we are to understand the 
relation of the blob to culture.  Few things have more hindered dialogue between social 
and cognitive sciences than proper consideration of what level we are dealing with and of 
the significance of the relation between these levels. 
What follows is, therefore, a rough attempt at distinguishing levels in the natural 
phenomenon because, I believe, this is necessary for understanding how social science, 
and especially anthropological, discussions concerning the blob can be integrated with 
those from the cognitive sciences. Interestingly, distinguishing levels also produces a 
kind of natural history of our species in that what I call the lower levels are characterised 
by features that we may assume are inherited from our very remote pre-mammalian 
ancestors since these are shared with other distant living species, while others, here 
qualified as higher, are unique specialisations of our species. The integration of 
anthropological considerations within the wider framework outlined here thus also 
suggests a facilitation of the integration of the social science theories within evolutionary 
theory (Seeley and Sturm 2006 p. 321ff). 
This preliminary attempt at distinguishing levels is based on the work of a number of 
scholars in cognitive science who tend to use one of the names of the blob: the self. 
Relying on these authors is, however, tricky since they are not all in agreement either.  
Fortunately, for the simple purposes of the present exercise, it is possible to by-pass the 
disagreements by concentrating on what most are agreed on.   What is crucial is that there 
indeed are very different levels to the blob, with the deepest levels shared by all living 
things and the highest levels creating the possibility of a narrative reflexive 
autobiography.  It is essential, however, to remember that all the levels one might choose 
to distinguish are simply points in what is a continuum, which means that they are all 
related to each other even though some are more directly culturally affected while others 
are not. All those involved in the discussions are agreed that somewhere in that 
progression language and reflexivity, meta-cognition or meta-representation, comes into 
play (e.g. Neisser 1988, Damasio 1999). 
First of all we can distinguish a level that has often been labelled the “core self”. 
 
  
Some aspects of this are very general indeed. These involve two things: 1) a sense of 
ownership and location of one’s body, 2) a sense that one is author of one’s own actions 
(David et al. 2008, Vogeley et al 2003).  This type of selfhood must be shared by all 
animate creatures since, as Dennett puts it, even a lobster who relishes claws must know 
not to eat his own (Dennett 1995:429). (I suspect that even the most dedicated cultural 
relativist is unlikely to argue that this level varies from one human group to another.) It 
should be noted that the word “sense”, as I have applied it to this level, is used here in a 
particularly thin way, implying no reflexive awareness whatsoever. However it must also 
be stressed that, even at this level, we are dealing with quite complex cognition as 
Descartes’ discussion of phantom limbs long ago emphasised, and also as is shown by 
experiments, such as those where a subject can be made to feel sensations in a model arm 
(Botvinick and Cohen: 1998). 
Above this level is one often labelled the “minimal self”. 
   
This involves the sense of continuity in time. Many animals from crows to chimpanzees 
have this sense of their own continuity and they, like us, attribute a similar continuity in 
time to their con-specifics (Hauser et al. 1995). This sense of continuity in time is crucial 
for the use of any type of longer term memory and seems essential for more advanced 
cognition such as the ability of self recognition, demonstrated, for example, in 
recognising oneself in a mirror.  Animals such as chimpanzees and gorillas can do this.  
Interestingly this sense of continuity of oneself and others is particularly developed in 
social species (Emery and Clayton 2004).  Here again, when we are dealing with this 
level, the word sense is used in a thin way. It does, however, imply the ability to “time 
travel”, that is to use information about the past for present behaviour which involves 
being in the past in imagination, and the ability to plan future behaviour which requires 
being in the future in imagination.  Nonetheless, it implies no reflexive awareness of the 
mental state that one is in. It involves the short term memory necessary to organise 
episodes, usually referred to as episodic memory  (Conway 2001) and it involves the 
retention of some such episodic memories without these being woven into a coherent 
story, at least not one which is recoverable in consciousness. 
Conscious access requires a higher stage which I call here, following a number of 
authors, “the narrative self” (Dennett 1992, Humphrey and Dennett 1989). 
   
In some earlier writing autobiographical memory was practically synonymous with the 
self but this is clearly misleading if we remember levels such as those indicated by the 
terms “core self” and “minimal self”; the term “narrative self” was created to both 
maintain and limit the scope of the link.  The narrative self and autobiographical memory 
imply each other (Tulving 1985).  All humans create, at least after the age of three or 
four, such an autobiography though it remains an open question whether this is also done 
by other animals (Gallup 1970). The narrative self significantly involves reflexive 
interaction with others so that the self can become, in Mead’s words “an object to one’s 
self in virtue of one’s social relation to other individuals” (Mead 1962:172 cited in 
Zahavi 2010). 
Before we go further I want to stress a point to which I shall return and which will 
become central for my argument. According to the model advanced here, the different 
levels of the blob are not fully separable. We are dealing instead with a continuum. 
   
A number of difficult questions surround autobiographical memory and the narrative self 
– whether it need be conscious, how far it requires language, and how far it can be 
equated with the stories that people actually tell about themselves (Nelson 2003, Bloch 
1998). 
Some authors, such as Dennett and Ricoeur (1985), have argued that this level 
necessarily implies consciousness, language and the ability to tell stories about oneself, in 
other words explicitly expressed autobiographical memory.  The difficulty with the 
notion of the “narrative self” comes precisely from this lumping together of different 
elements. Does the autobiography of autobiographical memory need be conscious or 
merely consciously accessible? Do autobiographical memory and the “narrative self” 
require language and, if not, is there not a non-linguistic narrative self, to be 
distinguished from a linguistic level? How far are we dealing with cognition or meta-
cognition, with representations or meta-representations?  In other words is having an 
autobiography the same thing as being aware that one has an autobiography? Is talking 
about one’s autobiographical past the same as having and using such an autobiographical 
memory, a capacity which, it is most likely, we share with non-linguistic anthropoids? 
These difficulties have been highlighted by the philosopher Galen Strawson in his 
discussion of the notion of the “narrative self” (Strawson 2005).  He argues that there are 
some people who are into creating conscious autobiographical narratives about 
themselves.  These he refers to as “diachronics”.  And there are others, like himself, who 
are just not interested in doing this. It is not their rhetorical style. He calls these latter 
people, somewhat unfortunately, “episodics”. Strawson intends the distinction to apply to 
all cultures at all times but the people he uses as examples are all Europeans or North 
Americans.  As will be made clear below, although I am sure he is right that everywhere 
and at all times there are individuals of both type, that does not mean that the distinction 
is not of use also in contrasting different cultural settings. 
Strawson convinces me that one should indeed separate those who merely manifest an 
“episodic self”, which does not involve a conscious and explicit expression of the kind of 
autobiography that one would talk about in natural circumstances, from those who 
manifest a  “diachronic” self who have a strong sense of having a narrative 
autobiographical self or an “I that is a mental presence now, was there in the past, and 
will be there in the future” and who, most likely, go on about it (Strawson 2005:68). 
Strawson talks of two different types of people, but this is so at the phenomenological 
level only.  However I would argue that, in terms of the constitution of the blob, both 
lots, in spite of different outward behaviour, have a narrative self. Only some people, 
Strawson’s diachronics, have an extra. They have a deep feeling of having a meaningful 
autobiography and are likely to engage in a particular form of activity which involves 
creating a meta-representational diachronic narrative self by talking about their feelings, 
their inner states and their autobiography. 
 
  
If that is so, Strawson is suggesting an answer to the questions which often are muddled 
together. The stories that some people tell about themselves and even about the feelings 
which they seem to express or about the nature of selves in their cultures are a quite 
different matter to whether they have a narrative self or not. Everybody has the kind of 
thing that Dennett and many other writers call a narrative self, if that is understood to 
involve only the basic elements shared by episodics and diachronics; but some people, 
the diachronics, go in for meta-representing this either to themselves or in spoken 
narratives. 
   
  
Others do not or do so much less.  And as Zahavi puts it, “we shouldn’t make the mistake 
of confusing the reflective, narrative grasp of a life with the pre-reflective experiences 
that make up that life prior to the experiences being organised into a narrative” (Zahavi 
2010:5). 
The difference between Strawson’s two types of people is thus much less fundamental 
than the differences in levels that I have been discussing so far. Indeed the fact that 
diachronics go in for meta-representations of themselves may be considered as a quite 
different matter than the constitution of the blob. Explicit manifestations are public acts 
and as such are determined by the social and cultural context in which they occur.   Thus, 
at the level of discourse, Strawson’s diachronics and episodics will appear very different 
in that they will sometimes talk about different things and possibly sometimes act in 
different ways but this does not mean that they belong to quasi different species. In fact 
the difference that anthropologists stress so dramatically may be little more than one of 
rhetorical style and is certainly not a difference in the nature of the blob. 
*** 
And this is where I return to anthropology.  At the beginning of this article I recounted 
how many anthropologists seem to argue that there are two different kinds of people in 
the world. What I believe they were talking about was something much less fundamental. 
They are distinguishing between the people who Strawson calls diachronics and those he 
calls episodics. This is a difference which I rephrase as between those people who have 
got into the habit of talking about their inner states and those who don’t.  This is an 
interesting difference but it does not mean that mankind is divided into two quasi species 
as is implied in the works I criticise. A surface difference is taken as a difference in 
substance. What such a mistake leads to is well illustrated by Unni Wikan in her criticism 
of Geertz’s depiction of the Balinese self (Wikan 1990). 
If we return to Mauss and Antze and Lambek we find that they were aware of the 
distinction between the Blob itself and Meta-representations of the Blob, but in spite of 
this they slide from one topic to another and in fact only talk of meta-representations 
when they wish to talk about the blob. Most anthropologists are vaguer and simply 
happily talk of meta-representations as though they were the blob. 
In those societies where, for historical/cultural reasons, it is acceptable, even encouraged, 
to talk about internal states of mind, individual motivations and autobiography, there are 
many diachronics and these will often take centre stage.  It should be noted however that, 
as they do this, they are not exposing their selves, their individuality, their personhood, 
their agency, to the harsh light of day.  They are doing something quite different; they are 
telling stories about themselves to others, which should not be mistaken for the complex 
business of being oneself among others. What they are doing when they are being 
diachronics, and this is the implicit point of Quinn’s criticism of post modernists, is 
interpreting those few aspects of their blob that are easily available to their 
consciousness, and then re-representing them as best they can, in other words publically 
meta-representing them.  This clearly reveals the error of the direct “representational” 
reading that anthropologists have made of such meta-representational activity, which has 
led them to consider discourse about the self and others to be what it is a representation 
of. 
In societies where, in most contexts, such meta-representational talk about one’s internal 
states and motivations is thought inappropriate or even immoral, discourse will obviously 
not normally be psychologically oriented but will be much more about the rules of 
behaviour that should be followed in groups, roles, rights and duties and exchange 
systems. This is my experience among the more remote Malagasy groups I have 
studied.[3] Such emphasis does not mean that we have found an alternative self, different 
from the self of the west where the rhetorical emphasis is on individuality and interiority.  
It is simply that when anthropologists are in societies where the glorifying of diachronics 
does not take place, they concentrate on the discourse about relations and morality – 
which, in any case, is found in all societies.  Quite misleadingly, they make this into a 
compatible, if alternative, blob, a kind of substitute concept of the person, or the 
individual, or the self or the agent, while in fact it is nothing of the sort. There is thus no 
basis for a contrast between two types of blob. 
This is all the more so as, most likely, we are dealing with a statistical difference not a 
categorical one. If the people of modern England are, as Strawson suggests, divided 
between phenomenological diachronics and episodics it is likely that the relative 
proportions are affected by the culture of England not merely by individual dispositions.  
If that is the case, it is also likely that in other cultures, these proportions will be 
different.  In my experience, talk about internal states and individual motivations does 
occur in Malagasy villages, although rarely. The individualist, self reflexive blob cultures 
of the west are merely those where a lot of people go in a lot for diachronic narratives 
while the “others” are ones where people are rarely tempted to go in for meta-
representation of their internal feelings. 
*** 
I have used Strawson’s distinction between episodics and diachronics to show that 
anthropology’s two kinds of people are nothing of the sort. 
However, an unfortunate conclusion could be drawn from the above. It might appear at 
this point that what I have argued is that meta-representations of the blob are cultural and 
that the blob itself is natural. This might be a modification to their theory that some 
culturalists or universalists might not have too much difficulty in accepting. They could 
then say: let the different disciplines get on with their own thing, the anthropologist talk 
about public meta-representations and the cognitive scientists talk about the fundamental 
blob. This would be totally misleading. 
Cognitive scientists and social scientists may have been talking of different things with 
the same words, but both really want to talk about the blob. Anthropologists often make it 
clear that they desire to say something about the blob itself, even though they are 
continually led astray by the easier accessibility of meta-representations. However if we 
become aware of this problem, which is also the source of the tiresome repetition of the 
debate in the social sciences, then a framework for a proper joint enterprise can be 
envisaged.  This I attempt to outline schematically in the last part of this article. 
*** 
First of all it is important to remember, again, the most significant fact that the levels of 
the blob I have distinguished are not separate or fully distinct.  There is a continuum from 
the core self to the narrative self (Squire 1992).[4] 
  
  
All levels interact. Thus the narrative self is continuous with the primate-wide 
requirements of the minimal self and the minimal self is continuous with the living-kind-
wide requirements of the core self. Similarly the narrative self is continuous with the 
minimal self which will itself be affected by the core self. We are psychologically and 
physically one. 
But there is also another aspect to the continuum of the blob. As we move to the higher 
levels, we also move from the internal and private level of such experiences as the 
awareness of ownership of one’s body and its location, towards the public, and therefore 
inevitably social, expressions of the narrative self. 
This gradual move from the private to the public and, above all, its internal continuity are 
particularly important if we are to understand how the cultural/historical affects the blob. 
We might be tempted to assume that the private is untouched by the cultural while the 
public, caught up in social discourse, is entirely cultural.  This would be misleading 
because it would forget the continuity of the blob through its various levels. The blob is a 
process. It is not a matter of a binary contrast but one of more or less. In other words, like 
icebergs, the blob is 90% submerged but the exposed part has no real independent 
existence from the submerged part and vice versa. 
Moreover, to the internal continuity of the blob must be added another continuity: that 
between blobs. This I have not considered so far. 
It is by means of the continual exchange between individuals that the cultural and, 
therefore, the historical character of the blob comes about (Sperber 1985, Dawkins 1976, 
Dennett 1995, Tomasello 1999). 
Thus the analogy with icebergs can also mislead because, unlike icebergs, the exposed 
parts of the different blobs are not fully distinct one from another. They are organically 
united with each other.  We are a social species and, as is the case for other social 
species, the fully isolated Cartesian individual cannot be anything other than what it was 
for Descartes – a thought experiment. It is through the continual complex social exchange 
between individuals which characterises our species, that history/culture becomes part of 
the process that is the blob.  This is so because this interchange, in the case of humans, is 
part of a process which involves not only the interaction of presently living public parts 
of blobs but also the indirect inter-creation of the public parts of living blobs with the 
once public parts of dead blobs, in some cases public parts of blobs dead long ago. 
The blob is not just situated in this process, it is itself moulded and modified by it to a 
significant degree. That the social and cultural character to a certain extent creates the 
blob has been stressed again and again in both the social science and the cognitive 
science literature, as it was in the remarks from Mead I quoted above.  The social and 
communicative aspect of humans has meant that the boundary between the individual 
organism in a species such as our own is only partial in that we go in and out of each 
others bodies, not only because of the physiological processes of birth and sex but also 
through the neuro-psychological processes of the synchronisation of minds that occurs in 
social exchange. This I discussed in an earlier paper (Bloch 2007; see also Humphrey 
2007). 
  
  
This process of inter-penetration and historical creation is of course what social scientists 
and especially social and cultural anthropologists have traditionally emphasised. It is 
essential to any theory of the blob. The exposed parts of different blobs are to a varying 
extent continuous with each other.   This applies not just to the levels of the narrative self 
but also to some aspects of lower levels captured by the term “minimal self”, since 
simpler but essential forms of joint action and therefore of interchange also exist.  The 
merging of public parts of blobs is never complete since differentiation of one’s blob 
from that of others is as necessary for the social process as is the inter-penetration of 
different blobs. 
This leads me to my very simple conclusion about the blob.  The blob is simultaneously 
caught up in two quite different continuities both of which, at either of their poles, link 
what are essentially alien elements.  One continuum links up, and to a certain extent 
merges, different but nonetheless distinct blobs, in other words, different people linked 
by social ties.  The other continuum links the totally sub conscious core blob with the 
potentially re-represented narrative level. As is the case with the social link, elements that 
are ultimately different are partially united into a not fully integrated, or integratable, 
whole. 
Thinking of either of these continuities is bad enough but we have to think of them 
together! If we do not, the difficult phenomenon we have to try to understand drains away 
with the bath water and we are left with concepts that cannot be related to anything in 
nature. The error of those cognitive scientists criticised by social scientists such as 
Durkheim is that they forgot the continuous social historical continuum and thus made 
mistakes that first year anthropology students have, as it were, explained to them again 
and again. We cannot talk of people in general without bearing in mind that they have 
been and are being made different to a certain extent by the social process. 
Cognitive scientists have recently discussed extensively the mechanism which makes the 
cultural nature of humans possible.  However, they have not taken on board the obvious 
implication of this: that because of culture there are no purely generic humans. The 
implications of this for research and more particularly cross cultural research are dramatic 
and rarely accepted.  It is that whatever empirical work we want to carry out demands 
that we first understand our subjects in their unique specificity and not just as fully 
formed humans who are then superficially affected by culture. 
The problem of the social scientists is double.  First of all, there is the fact that I 
discussed already.  On the whole, they have only looked at meta-representations of the 
blob and, occasionally, at the narrative level.  This is because this is what their research 
methods made easily available. They then have either pretended that these levels were the 
total blob or they have argued that these levels were clearly distinct from other levels, 
thereby implicitly importing the kind of nature/culture dichotomy that, in another 
register, they denounce. 
Secondly, when thinking about the blob they have forgotten its internal complexity.  This 
is what I have been stressing here.  They have forgotten that it seamlessly joins very 
different types of phenomena some of which, although inseparable, are totally unaffected 
by the mechanisms which they study. 
*** 
I have tried to reconcile the kind of ideas that have characterised anthropological writing 
on the blob with those that are found in cognitive science. I have attempted to build a 
model which can include the theoretical points and observations that have come from 
both sides within a system where the different factors that have interested social and 
cognitive scientists affect different parts of a single natural phenomenon. This is because 
representations of the human blob have to be compatible with the multiplicity of 
empirically inseparable processes within which we exist. All living things are caught in 
two processes, phylogeny and ontogeny.[5] When we are dealing with our species we 
have to add a third process: that of history. This I have included and revised in the 
discussion of cultural interaction. We must keep, at least in the back of our minds, all 
three processes otherwise we are forgetting the specific nature of the human animal. 
Instead, we move into a hazy land, where nothing can be situated in nature, and where 
mysterious words, such as those which I have merged together to create the blob 
proliferate, without anyone being able to explain how they relate to each other. This, of 
course, is inevitable when we are in the never-never land of culture without minds and 
bodies or in the never-never land of minds and bodies without culture and history. 
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2. Andre Béteille expresses the same frustration (Béteille 1991:251).  
3. Though it is also important to note that such talk about internal states can easily 
be generated as it can in England, thus showing that it exists in some contexts.  
This I have described in recent publications (including Bloch 2005).  
4. Squire shows that the old distinction between declarative and non declarative 
memory is not neurologically based.  
5. Our models must, therefore, talk of living things whose specificity, explicitly or 
implicitly, is comprehensible as the product of the process of natural selection. 
This is done here in that I have suggested something of the evolutionary history of 
the blob.  These living things must be able to be produced and develop, grow 
from single cells to the mature phenomena we claim they are.  I have not been 
able to touch on this here but I have used cognitive science literature which has 
begun to explore that side of things extensively (e.g. the studies in Moore and 
Lemmon: 2001).  
 
